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Abstract: Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One rea-
son to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘intro-
spectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently
suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in par-
tial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of par-
tial awareness for individuals’ moral responsibility. First, I argue that
responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals’ partial aware-
ness of their implicit biases makes them (partially) morally responsible for them.
I argue by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods.
1. Introduction
In an influential 2002 study, JohnDovidio and colleagues found that partic-
ipants, who were white college students, tended to have anti-racist explicit
attitudes but racially biased implicit attitudes. They explicitly disavowed
racism on a questionnaire but exhibited racial bias on an indirect, com-
puter-based measure (the Implicit Association Test; IAT). Subsequently,
they engaged in an unrelated conversation with one white and one black
interlocutor. During this interaction, the participants’ explicit anti-racist
attitudes best predicted the friendliness of what they said to the black inter-
locutor, while their implicit biases best predicted the unfriendliness of their
nonverbal ‘microbehaviors.’ They made less eye contact, blinked more
often, and sat farther away from the black interlocutor than the white inter-
locutor. Strikingly, the white participants generally formed positive
impressions of the conversations, while their black interlocutors tended to
believe that the participants were consciously prejudiced against them.
‘Our society is really characterized by this lack of perspective,’Dovidio says.
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‘Understanding both implicit and explicit attitudes helps you understand
how whites and blacks could look at the same thing and not understand
how the other person saw it differently’ (Carpenter, 2008, p. 36).
Widespread and frequent repetitions of such microbehaviors constitute
‘microinequities,’ which stack up over time to reinforce macro-level dispar-
ities between social groups (Valian, 1998). For example, Lilia Cortina et al.
(2011) found that women, and especially women of color, tended to report
experiencing more interpersonal incivility in the workplace than do men.
In many cases, the incivility did not consist in overt or intentional harass-
ment, or involve explicit reference to gender or race; rather it consisted in
generic forms of rudeness, such as speaking condescendingly or interrupting
a colleague. Discourteous behavior of this sort is deeply ambiguous: since
just about everybody interrupts and gets interrupted sometimes, it is difficult
to identify any particular instance of interruption as expressive of bias, as
opposed to, say, misplaced enthusiasm.1 But because women, and especially
women of color, were evidently treated in such uncivil ways more often, it
should come as no surprise that they were, as Cortina also found,more likely
to intend to quit. Cortina’s findings contribute to broader patterns of
evidence that suggest that experiencing a work environment as hostile leads
one to quit (e.g. Sims et al., 2005).
While gender- and race-based inequities depend to a great extent on struc-
tural-institutional forces, and while structural change is necessary for
redressing such inequities,2 these findings suggest that individuals’ subtle ex-
pressions of implicit bias aggregate to have significant negative conse-
quences. What responsibility, if any, do individuals bear for these subtle
expressions of bias? My answer is ‘some,’ and in this essay I try to make
some headway toward defending this position. I focus on the backward-
looking question whether individuals actually are responsible and
blameworthy. I advance a forward-looking case for the strategic role that
holding individuals responsible can play in combating discrimination and in-
equality elsewhere.3
Some maintain, however, that holding individuals responsible or blame-
worthy for expressing implicit bias would bemorally unfair and strategically
counterproductive. I will call these theorists Exonerators. For example,
Charles R. Lawrence, III writes:
Understanding the cultural source of our racism obviates the need for fault, as traditionally con-
ceived, without denying our collective responsibility for racism’s eradication. We cannot be in-
dividually blamed for unconsciously harboring attitudes that are inescapable in a culture
permeatedwith racism.Andwithout the necessity for blame, our resistance to accepting the need
and responsibility for remedy will be lessened (1987, pp. 32–6).
Exonerators like Lawrence argue that holding individuals responsible
would be unfair insofar as implicit racial biases are unconscious and inevita-
ble byproducts of being brought up in a systemically racist world.4 It might
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY2
© 2017 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2017 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
be strategically unwise to boot, if it leads individuals to become hostile rather
than supportive of social change.
Jules Holroyd has convincingly undercut many of the Exonerators’
claims, for instance by citing evidence that acquiring implicit biases is not
inevitable after all (2012, §2.1). However, Holroyd’s generally persuasive
defense of individual responsibility for implicit bias effectively concedes
two of the most intuitively powerful grounds for exoneration. These are,
first, that individuals may not be aware of their implicit biases in the relevant
sense, and, second, that even when made aware, individuals may not be able
to control them in the right way. Awareness strikes many as a non-negotia-
ble necessary condition for moral responsibility. Awareness is, moreover,
plausibly necessary for control, and control strikes many as another neces-
sary condition for responsibility.5 While Holroyd admits that there are cer-
tain qualified senses in which individuals might be aware and in control of
their implicit biases, she ultimately argues that awareness and control are
‘unreasonably demanding,’ too onerous to be necessary conditions for
moral responsibility (2012, p. 294; 2015, §3.1). Accepting these conditions,
she argues, would generate global skepticism about moral responsibility,
because individuals simply cannot be aware and in control of all the factors
influencing their actions. While I am sympathetic with the view that
awareness and control are not always necessary for moral responsibility
(Adams, 1985; Smith, 2004, 2005), I take it that awareness and control are
(often) at least sufficient for moral responsibility. That is, if individuals are
aware and in control of their implicit biases, so much the better for the claim
that they are responsible.
Here I argue that individuals are – at least to an important degree – aware
of their biases in a sense relevant to moral responsibility and blame. I also
believe that individuals are sufficiently in control of their biases, but I focus
on control elsewhere (2012, forthcoming, ms.). I hope to contribute to the
argument that individuals are morally responsible for their implicit biases
without appealing to comparatively controversial or revisionary claims
about the general requirements for moral responsibility. My focus will be
whether individuals are responsible for the behavioral expressions of their
biases – for acting in biased ways – rather than for simply acquiring or har-
boring biases at all.6 I refer to such behavioral expressions as implicit dis-
crimination. I review empirical evidence regarding the kinds and degrees of
awareness individuals have of their implicit discrimination (§2). I situate this
research in terms of a graded notion of responsibility, i.e. the view that
responsibility comes in degrees, which is both independently plausible and
useful for understanding responsibility for implicit discrimination in
particular (§3). To argue that individuals’ degree of awareness makes them
responsible for implicit discrimination, I offer an argument by analogy to
a close relative of implicit biases: moods (§4). I appeal to our ordinary
practices and reactive attitudes to argue that individuals are sufficiently
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aware of their moods so as to be responsible for mood-influenced
behavior. The awareness individuals have of implicit discrimination is
relevantly similar (§5).
2. Awareness of implicit bias and discrimination: Empirical
evidence
Tony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji (1995) introduced the term implicit
attitudes to counter the prevailing social-psychological assumption that peo-
ple could, as a rule, unproblematically report the contents of their beliefs and
feelings about social groups. They developed the IAT to measure implicit
attitudes, which they stipulatively defined as ‘introspectively unidentified
(or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable
or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects’ (p. 8). But
are implicit attitudes in-principle ‘unavailable to self-report and
introspection’ (p. 5), i.e. permanently concealed from our conscious minds;
or are they merely ‘unidentified (or inaccurately identified)’ in particular
cases, i.e. attitudes we may be conscious of but sometimes fail to notice, or
attitudes we may notice but sometimes fail to interpret accurately?
The content of implicit attitudes was originally thought to be ‘introspec-
tively inaccessible’ because participants did not report them, as in studies like
Dovidio’s. Participants might not have been aware that such biases exist at
all, that they themselves harbored them, that they were then expressing
them, or that they were able to do anything about them. Lacking awareness
in any of these respects might suffice to excuse their implicit discrimination.
But over a decade of evidence suggests otherwise. Researchers have found
numerous ways to reduce disparities between overt and indirect measure-
ments of attitudes. If participants are asked to ‘focus on their feelings,’ they
are more likely to report explicit attitudes in line with their implicit attitudes
(Gawronski and LeBel, 2008). When participants separately report both
their initial ‘gut reactions’ and their considered ‘actual feelings’ about social
groups, then their reported gut reactions correlate strongly with indirect
measures (Ranganath et al., 2008). That is, individuals seem more willing
to report prejudiced sentiments when they can clarify that they reflectively
disavow them. Participants also seem more willing to report prejudiced atti-
tudes when told that the IAT will be an ‘accurate measure of racial atti-
tudes,’ and ‘the closest thing to a lie detector that social psychologists can
use to determine your true beliefs about race’ (Nier, 2005, p. 43). In fact,
Hahn et al. (2014) dispensed with these pretexts and found that participants
could predict their performance on an IAT with impressive accuracy, even
when given virtually no explanation of what implicit attitudes are or how
they were to be measured. Moreover, participants who were given such ex-
planations were no better than naïve participants at predicting their
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performance. ‘Raising awareness’ – that is, increasing participants’ theoret-
ical knowledge of the nature and measurement of implicit attitudes – did not
improve their ability to predict their own implicit biases.
Perhaps most striking, Erin Cooley et al. (2015) found that simply telling
participants whether their ‘gut feelings’ did or did not reflect their ‘genuine’
views influenced self-reported attitudes. Some participants were told that the
negative gut feeling they may have had while looking at photos of same-sex
couples reflected their ‘genuine attitude towards homosexuality.’ Those who
had stronger anti-gay implicit biases were, on a subsequent questionnaire,
significantly more likely to oppose gay marriage and military enrollment.
By contrast, other participants were told that their gut feeling did not reflect
their genuine attitude; in this case, implicitly biased participants were likely
to support gay marriage and military enrollment.7 Cumulatively, these stud-
ies are difficult to interpret without supposing that participants tend to have
some introspective awareness of their implicit biases.8 Moreover, although
my focus here is the subtler manifestations of bias, this research also exem-
plifies how easy it is for authority figures (in this case, scientists, but presum-
ably also professors, parents, media personalities, and religious and political
leaders) to tap into and legitimize these negative gut feelings, and effectively
transform implicit bias into overtly endorsed discrimination. In fact, I argue
(ms.) that the recent resurgence of explicit bigotry and misogyny in North
America and Europe – and the apparent collapse of the consensus that it
is intolerable for political leaders to give full voice to prejudice – depend in
part on the fact that implicit biases have pervasively persisted as introspec-
tively accessible mental states, which are interpreted and acted-upon in var-
ious ways depending on structural-contextual factors such as power
relations and perceived social norms. Note, for example, that Cooley’s ‘gen-
uine attitude’ manipulation only elicited prejudiced self-reports from
individuals who displayed strong implicit biases. Those who lacked such
negative gut feelings in the first place were simply impervious to this
rhetorical maneuver.
Evidence for introspective awareness of these social gut feelings is not
new. In 1991, before the term ‘implicit attitude’ was coined, Devine and col-
leagues found evidence for robust self-awareness of tacit prejudice among in-
dividuals who espoused anti-prejudiced ideals. Participants reported how
they would versus should respond, according to their ‘own personal stan-
dards,’ in a variety of different situations. For example, they rated their
agreement or disagreement with statements such as, ‘Imagine that a Black
person boarded a bus and sat next to you. You should [would] feel uncom-
fortable that a Black is sitting next to you’ (1991, p. 819). Other situations
included ‘feeling uncomfortable that a job interviewer is Black,’ and ‘seeing
a Black woman with several small children and thinking “How typical.”’
Over 70% reported significant discrepancies between how they would and
should respond in these situations. They tended to admit that theywould feel
IMPLICIT BIAS, MOODS, ANDMORAL RESPONSIBILITY 5
© 2017 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2017 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
uncomfortable sitting next to a black person on the bus, but also to insist
that, by their own lights, they should not feel that way. Most who re-
ported such discrepancies also reported feeling guilty or disappointed with
themselves.9 Such findings suggest not just mere awareness of the exis-
tence and content of biased gut reactions, but a relatively rich knowledge
of both their moral significance and their effects on a range of thoughts,
feelings, and actions.
Examples from film, literature, and journalism arguably provide fur-
ther evidence for widespread awareness of implicit bias. In the film
Gentleman’s Agreement, for example, a reporter named Phil goes under-
cover to study anti-Semitism, pretending to be Jewish for six weeks. In
effect, Phil encounters repeated implicit discrimination. When he explains
to Kathy, his romantic interest (played by Dorothy McGuire), that, ‘I’m
going to let everybody know that I’m Jewish, that’s all,’ she responds by
saying, ‘Jewish? But you’re not, are you?’ The scene had to be repeatedly
re-shot because McGuire’s original look of dismay was too overt; it had
to be more subtle.10 Kathy’s tacit anti-Semitic attitudes are particularly
salient in the film because she first came up with the idea for an exposé
of anti-Semitism. Her commitment to root out concealed prejudice sets
the film’s plot in motion, making hers a case of sincere egalitarianism
coupled with implicit anti-Semitism. In many ways, the film is structured
around the transformation she undergoes in coming to face her own ex-
plicitly disavowed biases. The director bluntly described the film’s mes-
sage this way: ‘You are an average American and you are anti-Semitic.
Anti-Semitism is in you.’11
Gentleman’s Agreement came out in 1947 (E. Levy, 2005; Kazan, 1947),
seven years before social psychologist Gordon Allport’s seminal work, The
Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954). The film won the Academy Awards
for Best Picture, Best Director, and Best Supporting Actress. The New York
Times wrote that, ‘To millions of people throughout the country, it should
bring an ugly and disturbing issue to light.’12 Although it was received by
some as a revelation, it is implausible that Gentleman’s Agreement could
have achieved such notoriety if the phenomena it examined had been
completely alien to the lived experience of Americanmoviegoers (a common
criticism of the film, then and now, is that the journalist is so surprised by
what he learns about tacit anti-Semitism). Gentleman’s Agreement was fic-
tional, but it inspired white journalists Ray Sprigle (1949) and John Howard
Griffin (1961) to artificially darken their skin, pretend to be black, and write
memoirs of their experiences of discrimination. Both memoirs were widely
publicized. Sprigle won the Pulitzer Prize. Griffin won the Davenport Cath-
olic Interracial Council’s Pacem in Terris Peace and Freedom Award, and
his memoir was adapted into a 1964 film of the same name.
More recently, Avenue Q, winner of the 2004 Tony Award for Best Musi-
cal, includes a song entitled, ‘Everybody’s a Little Bit Racist:’
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Everyone’s a little bit racist/ Sometimes./ Doesn’t mean we go/ Around committing hate
crimes./ Look around and you will find/ No one’s really color blind./ Maybe it’s a fact/
We all should face/ Everyone makes judgments/ Based on race…
If we all could just admit/ That we are racist a little bit,/ Even though we all know/ That it’s
wrong,/ Maybe it would help us/ Get along.
With these works in mind, I take contemporary empirical research on im-
plicit bias to be contributing to how we understand phenomena that have
been part of our collective awareness for quite some time, and ipso facto part
of the awareness of a great many individuals. Moreover, before the recent
explosion of research on implicit attitudes, quite a few feminists, race theo-
rists, and activists sought to draw attention to related issues – although their
efforts were often less publicized and laureled than the writings of white men
like Sprigle and Griffin. Exactly how our collective awareness of tacit preju-
dice and discrimination has progressed (or regressed, or been repeatedly
repressed) over time is an important question in its own right (see, e.g.,Mills,
1997), but not one I will explore further here.
So, for example, Washington and Kelly (2016, p. 23, original emphasis)
are wrong to say, ‘In 1980, no one knew the unsettling psychological facts
about implicit biases; the psychological research had not yet been done,
and so today’s wealth of empirical evidence simply did not exist.’Many peo-
ple knew, and the knowledge was (occasionally) broadcast widely.13
Certainly the quality and depth of our knowledge has changed as more
research has been done, and I grant that these developments make a differ-
ence to our moral responsibility. But, like so much else in this domain (§3),
these are differences of degree. Instead of asserting that individuals were
categorically not blameworthy in 1980 but are blameworthy now, a more
natural response is that individuals were simply less blameworthy then
than now, or so I’ll argue. Conversely, to argue that these differences
are of kind rather than degree, some account of what the thresholds are
and when our community crossed them seems required (cf. Washington
and Kelly, 2016, pp. 28–32).
Of course, then and now, many people have lacked sophisticated theoret-
ical knowledge about implicit bias. But most also lack scientific knowledge
about their moods, beliefs, and all other folk-psychological states. Is there
a categorical and normatively relevant difference between implicit biases
and other mental states on this score? If we assume (as I do) that ordinary,
theoretically naïve agents are sometimes morally responsible, e.g. that
self-avowed racists are responsible and blameworthy for overt discrimina-
tory behavior, then it’s frankly unclear why widespread theoretical
knowledge of implicit bias should be relevant to individual attributions of
responsibility and blame.14
But how do we square all this evidence for awareness with findings like
Dovidio’s, in which white participants seemed completely oblivious of their
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visible discomfort and unfriendly behaviors toward blacks? Their appar-
ent lack of awareness is especially striking in light of Devine et al.’s
(1991) finding that participants tended to predict that they would feel in-
appropriately uncomfortable in interracial interactions much like this one.
Nevertheless, I don’t think we have to look very hard for a variety of
plausible ways of fitting all the evidence together.15 For example, perhaps
Dovidio’s participants would have been more willing to admit discomfort
and admit to making less eye contact if they had been queried about hy-
pothetical cases, rather than queried about the awkward interaction they
had just fumbled through. Perhaps they would have admitted discomfort
if given the opportunity to clarify that their gut feelings don’t reflect their
considered commitments or personal standards (or if an admired political
leader had encouraged them to believe their discomfort was actually jus-
tified). Perhaps the stress of the interaction, or their anxiety about
appearing racist, or simple wishful thinking prevented them from noticing
or reporting their negative gut feelings and microbehaviors. In fact, while
studies like Dovidio’s find direct correlations between implicit bias and
negative microbehaviors (e.g. McConnell and Leibold, 2001; Jacoby-Sen-
ghor et al., 2016), other studies find that implicitly biased participants can
sometimes ‘hold it together’ and act friendly during intergroup interac-
tions, but then show signs of cognitive fatigue afterward (Richeson and
Shelton, 2007; Gonsalkorale et al., 2009). In these cases, participants seem
to be actively suppressing their negative impulses, at least temporarily.
Needless to say, it would be difficult to suppress an impulse of which
one was completely unaware.
While many empirical questions remain unanswered, it seems clear that
we cannot cast implicit biases into what popular authors such as Gladwell
(2005) call ‘the locked door of the unconscious.’ Individuals are, or can
be, introspectively aware of their biased gut reactions, and even aware
of discrepancies between how they would and should (according to their
considered judgments) respond in various situations. The working hypoth-
esis should be that the affect-laden contents of implicit biases contribute,
or are available, to conscious experience, although in many instances
without being the object of explicit attention. The evidence is best under-
stood in light of a familiar distinction between the content of one’s phe-
nomenology (i.e. that which is experienced) and the content of one’s
focal attention. That is, they may be felt without being noticed, just as a
person can be in a grumpy or lighthearted mood without noticing as
much. Different theories of consciousness will characterize (roughly) this
distinction differently. In Block’s (1995) terms, implicit attitudes are phe-
nomenally conscious, if not always access conscious. According to a
higher-order or attention-based theory of consciousness, implicit attitudes
would typically be potentially conscious, i.e. accessible even if not often
accessed (see also Madva, 2016a).
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What are the implications of this often partial and inarticulate aware-
ness of implicit bias for moral responsibility? Are individuals who act
on the basis of such biased gut feelings responsible and blameworthy?
Among the ‘folk,’ there seems to be traction to the intuition that such in-
dividuals would be responsible. In Cameron, Payne and Knobe (2010),
participants assessed the responsibility and blameworthiness of hypotheti-
cal employers, renters, and exam graders influenced by implicit racial
bias. Some participants read about an individual who ‘thinks people
should be treated equally, regardless of race’ but ‘has a sub-conscious dis-
like for African Americans’ (2010, p. 276). He tries to promote people on
merit alone, but ‘because he is unaware of this sub-conscious dislike,’ he
‘sometimes unfairly denies African Americans promotions.’ Other
participants read about an individual who ‘has a gut feeling of dislike
toward African Americans’ – which he is aware of, and sincerely rejects,
but has ‘difficulty controlling.’ Participants tended to judge that the
individual who was aware of his dislike, but struggled to control it, was
significantly more responsible and blameworthy than the one who was
unaware of it altogether.
I share the intuition that being partly aware of one’s implicit biases
increases the degree to which one is responsible for them. In what fol-
lows, I defend this intuition by drawing an analogy between implicit
biases and moods. First I urge that awareness, control, responsibility,
and blameworthiness all come in degrees (§3). I then argue that the
degree of awareness individuals have of their moods suffices to make
them morally responsible for mood-influenced behavior (§4), and that
individuals’ awareness of implicit bias is importantly similar (§5). I
defend many of these claims by appeal to our ordinary practices and
reactive attitudes. I recognize, however, that Exonerators tend not to
share the intuition that individuals are responsible for implicit discrim-
ination, and they might further argue that appeals to ‘folk’ intuition
and ordinary practices are unreliable guides for moral reflection on im-
plicit bias (see Levy, 2017, pp. 4–5). I will not offer a wholesale de-
fense of the methodological value of appeals to intuition and
practices (I certainly agree that intuitions and practices can be wrong).
Instead, I’ll offer a more concessive response on these issues: what fol-
lows can, to a significant extent, be construed as a partial explanation
of the sources of the common intuition that individuals are responsible
for implicit discrimination. That is, it represents an attempt to situate
this intuition in a more familiar web of moral practices and attitudes.16
Better understanding the intuition’s sources is useful even if we ulti-
mately decide that, for whatever reason, the intuition is mistaken. In
fact, it could be useful for the purposes of figuring out why it’s mis-
taken. To that extent, then, I think Exonerators can accept much of
what follows.
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3. Responsibility in degrees
Awareness strikes many as a necessary condition for responsibility.
However, research on implicit bias (and on consciousness more generally)
suggests that awareness is not an all-or-nothing affair. It is possible for
individuals to be partly but not perfectly aware of their mental states, for
example, when a headache is felt but initially unnoticed, or when a stressful
feeling of hunger is noticed but misinterpreted as anger at another person
(Bushman et al., 2014). Awareness comes in degrees. In fact, it is increasingly
clear that all the core notions in this family of concepts – awareness, control,
responsibility, and blameworthiness – are graded (Björnsson and Persson,
2013; Buchak, 2014; Coates and Swenson, 2013; Raz, 2010; Sinnott-Arm-
strong, 2013).
Although my primary focus in this essay is awareness, briefly consider
control. Exonerators point out that even if individuals are aware of their im-
plicit biases, they may not be able to control them properly. Sometimes
trying to control implicit discrimination even exacerbates its harms (Norton
et al., 2006). At issue here is what I call local control, the ability to directly
control implicit discrimination in particular instances, which differs from in-
direct control, which involves taking steps in advance to block discrimination
(e.g. anonymous reviewing) and long-term control, which involves debiasing
one’s social habits through repeated practice (Madva, 2012, 2016a,b,
forthcoming; see also Holroyd, 2012, §2.2; Levy, 2017). A central consider-
ation is whether implicit discrimination is altogether uncontrollable or
merely difficult to control. The evidence suggests the latter: controlling
implicit discrimination can indeed be difficult – taxing, demanding,
depleting – but not impossible. Implicit discrimination truly exceeds
individual control only in rarefied circumstances, such as during timed com-
puterized tasks cleverly designed by psychologists for the express purpose of
circumventing control. These tasks become trivially easy when participants
can take all the time they need.Normatively speaking, there is a world of dif-
ference between being difficult and impossible to control. Controlling the
expression of our bladders can sometimes be difficult, but, for healthy
adults, conditions have to be extreme before control is altogether lost, and
we readily incorporate such considerations (about individuals’ health and
specific circumstances, e.g. if a person is unwell, pregnant, or just overcome
by intense laughter) into our normative assessments of breakdowns of
bladder control.
Control is thus a matter of degree. Theorists have widely acknowledged
the significance of this fact for assessing the responsibility of individuals in
compromised circumstances, such as addicts (Holton and Berridge, 2013;
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013), children (Mele, 2006), and negligent agents
(Raz, 2010). Such individuals are somewhat in control and therefore some-
what responsible. This seems a point of growing consensus especially among
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philosophers working at the intersection of normative theory and empirical
and clinical research in psychology, neuroscience, and experimental philos-
ophy. I agree with such analyses, and take implicit discrimination to be rel-
evantly similar, falling somewhere between full control and the total lack
thereof. Borrowing a term from Schwitzgebel’s (2010) work on belief, we
might say that phenomena like implicit bias and addiction are ‘in-between’
controllable – and infer that individuals are, therefore, in-between responsi-
ble for controlling them.
Exonerators typically opt for a different strategy, seeking out morally sig-
nificant properties of implicit biases distinct from responsibility and blame.
For example, Zheng (2016) argues that implicit biases are not always ‘attrib-
utable’ to agents’ real selves (cf. Brownstein, 2015; Levy, 2011, 2017), but
that individuals may nevertheless be ‘accountable’ for them.17 A central mo-
tivation for drawing such distinctions betweenmore and less ‘stinging’ forms
of moral criticism is the pragmatic, forward-looking concern that laying
blame will be counterproductive, which I address elsewhere (2012, 2016b,
forthcoming, ms). But distinguishing attributability from accountability is
compatible with a graded conception of responsibility; in fact, I think
attributability and accountability are also graded.
An alternative view, defended perhaps by Fischer and Ravizza (1998), is
that responsibility is binary (i.e. all-or-nothing: there exist necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for responsibility that are simply satisfied or not), but that
blameworthiness is a matter of degree. But it is mysterious why we should
continue to believe that responsibility is binary if awareness, control, and
blame (and other related phenomena, such as reason-responsiveness,
attributability, duress, criminal and civil punishments, etc.) all come in
degrees. It is difficult to imagine non-arbitrary ways of setting thresholds
for the minimal degrees of awareness and control that would be necessary
to pass from unalloyed innocence to unequivocal responsibility.18
Given that a graded notion of responsibility is independently plausible,
why not apply it to the case of implicit bias? The reasoning here is straight-
forward: individuals are somewhat aware and somewhat in control of their
implicit discrimination, and so they are somewhat responsible, and some-
what to blame. They are more responsible than they would be for purely un-
conscious, reflexive or pathological behavior, but they are less responsible
than they would be for explicit discriminatory behavior. When individuals’
awareness of their implicit biases is not fully comprehensive or articulate –
as when an implicit bias is felt but not noticed, or noticed but misinterpreted,
or when it is interpreted correctly but its causal influence on judgment or ac-
tion is underestimated – these are mitigating factors. They make the individ-
ual in question less responsible but not completely off the hook.
Determining the precise extent of an individual’s responsibility and blame-
worthiness for a specific action or omission is a complex, context-sensitive
affair, analogous in some respects to the nuances and challenges of
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determining criminal or civil liability. I will say more about what goes into
this ‘responsibility calculus’ in §§4–5.
Next I argue that our ordinary practices already accommodate relevantly
similar in-between cases of moral responsibility. Moods represent another
type of mental state that occupies this moral middle ground.
4. Awareness, reactive attitudes, and moods
Some philosophers claim that the awareness relevant to responsibility is a
kind of reflective one, on display when an individual ‘steps back’ and
considers, e.g., whether it would be appropriate to act on a particular desire
(e.g. Korsgaard, 1997). This reflective awareness clearly requires that the
relevant desire be explicitly noticed, accessed, and attended-to. I take it that
this sort of reflective awareness seems intimately tied to responsibility
because the ability to step back and reflect is thought to be the best candidate
for enabling an individual to control her automatic impulses. Intuitively, it is
when an individual can take amoment to deliberate that she is best poised to
resist her immediate inclinations.
The capacity for this sort of reflective awareness may be necessary for an
individual to be a possible candidate for responsibility and blame in the first
place. It is a plausible background condition essential to being the sort of
entity to whom responsibility and blame could ever appropriately be
assigned. But it is less plausible that, in particular cases, an individual has
to be capable of stepping back and reflecting in order to be responsible for
what she does. In our ordinary practices, we often take less robust forms
of awareness to be sufficient for, or at least directly relevant to, responsibility
and blame.
Consider how we commonsensically understand the effects of moods on
behavior, and how this understanding in turn figures in our attributions of
responsibility.19 Suppose Gertie is in a grumpy mood. She might have no
knowledge of the causal source of her mood; it could be due to stress, hun-
ger, a headache, air pollution (Rotton et al., 1978), hitting one red light
too many during the morning commute, or simply ‘waking up on the wrong
side of the bed.’Her mood might have all sorts of unknown effects on what
she thinks and does. Still, it would be hasty to conclude that the mood itself
(or its content, whatever it may be) is in any deep respect unconscious.
Gertie may not even notice that she is in a grumpy mood, but she is in one
just the same, and feeling it all the while. Perhaps her mood passes in and
out of focal awareness, or perhaps it just hovers in the periphery.20 These
are empirical, if notoriously difficult to tackle, questions.
But the fact that she fails to notice her grumpymood would not simply ex-
onerate any rude behavior this grumpiness might cause – or so we intuitively
think.21 We routinely hold others and ourselves responsible for the things
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said and done because of bad moods. If Gertie’s mood leads her to roll her
eyes, adopt a cantankerous tone, or interrupt a friend or colleague (or even
a stranger), the latter would intuitively be warranted in holding her respon-
sible and blameworthy for doing so. If Mordy is in a good mood because he
has just received exciting news, hemight fail to react with sufficient empathy
and concern when he discovers Gertie has received bad news, and Gertie
might reasonably hold it against him.
It’s true that being influenced by a mood canmake a difference to respon-
sibility and blame. Citing a badmood as a (partial) explanation for inappro-
priate behavior can make the behavior appear less objectionable, somehow
mitigating the severity of the offence (perhaps the behavior comes to seem
less intentional or ‘personal’). It could be that citing a bad mood leads us
to judge that the behavior is less blameworthy, or it could be that citing a
bad mood leads us to shift blame from the behavior itself to the failure to re-
strain the behavior. In the latter case, individuals might just be responsible
for letting the mood get the best of them.22
Some nevertheless identify mood-related misbehavior as blameless. Levy
(2011, p. 245) mentions in passing a case in which, ‘George’s shortness with
his colleagues might be excused because of the stress he has been under re-
cently,’ insofar as George is not properly aware of the reasons for his acting
that way.23 I agree that stress can play a mitigating role, but Levy seems to
overstate its exonerating force. If we seriously entertain being one of
George’s colleagues, would we ordinarily take his stress to fully exculpate
his shortness? Would it transport him entirely from the realm of responsibil-
ity and blame, and lead us to switch completely from the ‘participant’ to the
‘objective’ stance described by Strawson? I think not (although it might
depend to some extent on the details of the case, for example, on just how
trying or traumatic the source of stress is). A graded conception of responsi-
bility more naturally accommodates this sort of case. Learning that George
has been under stress may help to make his shortness more intelligible to his
colleagues, without thereby giving him free license to be uncivil. George’s
being under stress might mitigate the severity of his offence, making him less
responsible and blameworthy, without becoming completely off the hook
for his rudeness. In short, moods mitigate, not exonerate.
The mitigating status of moods can be illuminated by considering how we
offer and accept apologies for mood-influenced behavior. When George
snaps at his colleague, and subsequently apologizes, he might say, ‘I’m sorry
for being irritable. I’ve just been under a lot of pressure lately,’ or, ‘I just
woke up on the wrong side of the bed today.’ How would his colleague re-
spond in this case? Would the colleague say, ‘Come now, you have nothing
to apologize for. You didn’t do anything wrong.’More likely, the colleague
would say something like, ‘It’s okay. Don’t worry about it. I know things
have been stressful for you.’ The apology is not out of place here, I argue,
because citing a bad mood does not completely absolve one of responsibility
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or blame. It often has the effect of putting the person on the receiving end of
the rudeness in a position to accept the apology, or acknowledge it some
way, rather than deny the need for it altogether. This sort of mitigating fac-
tor thus does not transport an individual out of the realm of responsibility
and blame, but shifts her location within that space.
The mitigating role of moods is, of course, subject to a number of compli-
cating factors. For one thing, it makes a difference what sort of behavior is
supposed to be illuminated by reference to the bad mood. Being influenced
by a mood can affect an individual in many ways beyond unfriendly
microbehaviors, perhaps by making her a harsher grader or a less sympa-
thetic interviewer. What if George’s stress leads not just to shortness but to
verbally abusive screams, or significant property damage, or violence? If a
mood leads an individual to punch someone in the face, or to deny a parole
application (Danziger et al., 2011), then citing it might do considerably less
exculpatory work. Other things equal, the more serious the consequences of
the behavior, the less mitigating we’ll take a badmood to be.24 If we are ever
justified in adjusting our attributions of responsibility and blame in light of
the severity of consequences, then part of the justification might lie in our
(more or less explicit) knowledge that people are often better able to control
themselves when the stakes are raised. For example, someone in a badmood
might be much more able, or at least more likely, to restrain his rude im-
pulses in the presence of an armed mugger than in the presence of a close
friend, or – to take an example more pertinent to implicit bias – in the pres-
ence of his bosses than in the presence of subordinates. Suppose these exter-
nal factors do affect how easy it is to control the influence of moods on
behavior. The upshot is not that individuals ought to be exonerated for their
mood-related misbehavior when the stakes are low, or when it is difficult to
control, but that they are, at least to some degree, responsible for such be-
havior regardless of the presence or absence of these mitigating factors.
I cannot here capture all the nuances of our intuitions and practices sur-
rounding mood-related misbehavior. Nevertheless, it seems that, in paradig-
matic cases, when an agent is in a bad mood, and as a result acts in an
unfriendly way, she is to a certain degree (held) responsible and blamewor-
thy, even if she never introspectively noticed being in that mood. Being
influenced by this unnoticed psychological state does not transport her out
of the realm of responsibility for her actions.
There are for my purposes two sorts of pernicious effects that moods can
have on behavior.25 The first is an expressive harm: foul moods can lead in-
dividuals to express unwarranted negative affect toward others. Such expres-
sive harms, and the moral importance of affective phenomenal experiences
more generally, were a centerpiece of Strawson’s (1962) influential essay.
The reactive attitudes he cited as integral to our understanding of responsi-
bility were not the cold, cognitive evaluations judges and jurors are asked to
make in determining the scope of a defendant’s criminal responsibility.
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Rather, they were affective and unreflective. We care about whether people
bear us good or ill will, whether they appreciate or resent us, smile or frown.
Expressions of good or ill will are as much, or sometimes even more so, a
matter of our immediate tendencies to react to others as they are a matter
of our reflective judgments about those reactions. We care about how others
actually feel about us, and this is true to some extent independently from
whether they would reflectively endorse (acting upon) those feelings. We
take the automatic, affect-expressive behaviors of others to reflect their atti-
tudes toward us, and to license certain affect-laden responses fromus in turn,
such as when I feel resentful toward you for being short with me. These
affective reactions are first and foremost part of phenomenal awareness:
qualitatively felt even if not explicitly noticed. Individuals can become reflec-
tively aware of them, but they need not in order for those reactions to
constitute tacit forms of approval or disapproval, and to be potential candi-
dates of praise or blame. In this vein, mood-related rudeness is (ordinarily
treated as) a prima facie expression of ill will that needs to be accounted
for somehow. People deserve to be treated civilly, and feeling grumpy is
not a license to shirk common courtesy.
Apart from this expressive harm, a second significant effect of moods is
that they bias cognition, leading individuals to selectively attend to, ig-
nore, misinterpret, and even misperceive features of their environment
(Sizer, 2000). A mood might lead individuals to misperceive a sincere smile
as a smug smirk, or to dwell on the shortcomings of a résumé and overlook
its merits. For example, Forgas (2011) manipulated participants’moods be-
fore they read a philosophy essay either written by ‘a middle-aged bearded
man in a suit with spectacles’ or ‘a young woman with frizzy hair wearing
a t-shirt.’ Participants in a good mood relied on their gut feelings, and eval-
uated the older man’s essay, competence, and likeability much more highly
than the young woman’s. However, being in a bad mood induced more vig-
ilant, attentive thinking, and reduced this age/gender bias to statistical insig-
nificance. In such cases, the mood itself may be entirely unnoticed, but it
leads to distortions of what we do notice.26
Suppose a tired or angry individual drives past a stop sign without slowing
down. In many such cases, it is plausible that the driver saw the stop sign
(onemight say that ‘it passed through her field of vision’), but did not explic-
itly notice it because of the bad mood. In these cases, the relevant feature of
the situation is right there in front of us, and, insofar as we are generally
competent at reading résumés and faces, or noticing traffic signals, wewould
(ceteris paribus, take ourselves to) be culpable if we later discovered that we
had failed to respond to it properly.27 The unreflective nature of the error
might be a mitigating factor (again, the wrong might come to seem less per-
sonal), but we’d nevertheless have something to make good on, or apologize
for. Part of our willingness to hold individuals responsible in these cases, I
submit, is that the individuals in question genuinely perceive (at least to
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some degree) the relevant feature of the situation, although they fail to re-
spond to it appropriately.
Again, different theories of consciousness and perception will characterize
these phenomena in different terms. One might deny, for example, that the
individual genuinely, consciously perceives the stop sign, and say that the in-
dividual is simply poised to perceive it. Even so, there is still room to say the
individual should have been aware, should have accessed the information,
etc. (and, of course, being poised to perceive will also be matter of degree).
On this line, these cases would approximate a certain kind of negligence,
when an agent detects something tacitly, and should respond to it (perhaps
by becoming access-conscious or focally aware of it), but fails to. In such
cases, obliviousness could be blameworthy. I will not here adjudicate
between these different interpretations because, either way, these factors
mitigate blameworthiness without exonerating one entirely. In these cases,
it is either our tacit awareness or our potential awareness of the feature that
makes us responsible for responding to it, while our mood distorts our
capacity to notice, interpret, or respond to it appropriately. Tacit awareness
puts us on the hook, but the mood mitigates the offence.
5. Awareness, responsibility, and implicit bias
Now consider two cases that involve not (merely) bad moods but implicit
biases. First, take George Yancy’s rich phenomenological analysis of
stepping into an elevator:
Well-dressed, I enter an elevator where a white woman waits to reach her floor. She ‘sees’ my
Black body, though not the same one I have seen reflected back to me from the mirror on any
number of occasions. Buying into the myth that one’s dress says something about the person,
one might think that the markers of my dress (suit and tie) should ease her tension. What is it
that makes the markers of my dress inoperative? She sees a Black male body ‘supersaturated
with meaning, as they [Black bodies] have been relentlessly subjected to [negative] characteriza-
tion by newspapers, newscasters, popular film, television programming, public officials, policy
pundits and other agents of representation’. Her body language signifies, ‘Look, the Black!’
On this score, though short of a performative locution, her body language functions as an
insult. Over and above how my body is clothed, she ‘sees’ a criminal, she sees me as a threat.
Independently of any threatening action on my part, my Black body, my existence in Black,
poses a threat.
There is not anything as such that a Black body needs to do in order to be found blameworthy.
As such, the woman on the elevator does not really see me, and she makes no effort to challenge
how she seesme… shemay come to judge her perception of the Black body as epistemologically
false, but her racismmay still have a hold on her lived body. I walk into the elevator and she feels
apprehension. Her body shifts nervously and her heart beats more quickly as she clutches her
purse more closely to her. She feels anxiety in the pit of her stomach. Her perception of time
in the elevator may feel like an eternity… The point here is that deep-seated racist emotive
responses may form part of the white bodily repertoire, which has become calcified through
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quotidian modes of bodily transaction in a racial and racist world... Despite how my harmless
actions might be constructed within her white racialized framework of seeing the world, I remain
capable of resisting the white gaze’s entry into my own self-vision. I am angered. Indeed, I find
her gaze disconcerting and despicable (Yancy, 2008, pp. 846–7).
Drawing on Du Bois, Fanon, and Gooding-Williams, Yancy mines this
scenario to make several points. I will highlight just a few. (1) Yancy is wear-
ing a suit and tie. It is unlikely that a white man so adorned would be per-
ceived as a similar threat,28 but the woman’s racial attitudes bias her
cognition, and prevent her from noticing or being moved by these standard
markers of ‘respectability.’ (2) Yancy takes for granted that the woman’s
distorted perception reflects the fact that she has been bombarded with stig-
matizing representations of black men in ‘mass media.’ That is, it’s built into
the case that her implicit discrimination (a range of automatic perceptual, cog-
nitive, affective, and bodily responses) is a product of her immersion in a sys-
temically biased world. (3) The womanmight reflectively disavow her implicit
discrimination, i.e. harbor sincere egalitarian commitments and ‘judge her
perception of the Black body’ to be false. (4) But her implicit discrimination
nevertheless constitutes, or is at least experienced as, an insult to Yancy – a
tacit act of blame – which is despicable and elicits justified anger. Although
Yancy is acutely aware of factors like (2) and (3), which plausibly mitigate
her responsibility and blameworthiness, his moral resentment persists.
It could be that Yancy would feel less resentment and benefit psychologi-
cally if he actively concentrated on the mitigating factors, e.g. by reminding
himself that the woman’s biases are simply byproducts of an upbringing in
an unjust social reality, but the presence of these factors does not obviously
make her blameless. She might not be as blameworthy as she would be if she
reflectively endorsed her implicit discrimination, but she is more blamewor-
thy than she would be for a mere behavioral reflex, like blinking in response
to a bright light. In fact, I think that if we seriously imagine ourselves in
Yancy’s shoes, it is quite difficult to insist that the woman is completely un-
conscious of these reactions, or completely free of blame. The suggestion
that her affective-bodily responses are on a moral par with behavioral re-
flexes, or that it is Yancy’s responsibility to exercise cognitive-therapeutic
techniques to reduce his stress (rather than the woman’s responsibility to
not act that way) strikeme as quite problematic.While we need not conclude
of her, or each other more generally, that we are all bad prejudiced people, it
is fair to conclude that she could be, in an important sense, better than she is,
and that we could be better than we are.
The potential for implicit biases to influence what we notice and howwe re-
spond is also evident in the following interaction described byVirginia Valian:
A storm has damaged a large tree in the back yard, and a tree surgeon has come to look
at it … As I ask the tree expert various questions about the damage and what needs to
be done, I feel there is something a little odd about his responses. Finally, I realize that I
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am looking at him when I ask my questions, but that he is looking at J when he answers
them. For his part, J is mostly looking abstractly out into space, reflecting his lack of in-
terest in the proceedings. For the entire consultation, in fact, J is silent. I continue with
my questions, and the surgeon continues to direct his answers to J. Perhaps he is riveted
by J’s virtuosic ventriloquism. I got the information I wanted, but I don’t know what
modifications I might have made – speaking louder? asking longer questions? being more
assertive? – to get the tree surgeon to talk to me instead of J. I can imagine the surgeon
saying to his crew afterward, ‘Did you see that woman? She didn’t let that guy get a
word in edgewise.’ J himself has noticed nothing, because he has been thinking about
something else the whole time (1998, p 146).
In this case, my intuition is that the tree surgeon is somewhat re-
sponsible and blameworthy for failing to attend to the relevant social
cues, and for acting in an oblivious, uncivil way. Unless he suffers
from a visual impairment, extreme social anxiety, etc., he knows who
is asking the questions, and how to answer a person who asks a ques-
tion. His social environment is giving him ample information to suggest
that he should adjust his unreflective behavior, but he fails to absorb
it. Valian would be warranted in resenting him for this behavior, rather
than just, say, resenting American culture more broadly for leading the
tree surgeon to develop these habits of selective attention (although she
could reasonably resent American culture, too). In this case, the tree
surgeon’s bias may not lead him to express any sort of negative affect,
as did the woman on the elevator, but it does lead him to discount or
ignore what’s right in front of him, and culpably so. Part of the expla-
nation for this, I believe, is the implausibility of supposing that the tree
surgeon is completely unaware of what he’s doing. Suppose Valian had
said something explicitly about his failure to make eye contact. He
might have reacted with defensive hostility or denied that he meant
any ill will, but would he really have had no clue what she was even
referring to?
It is not just that we can trace things back to some prior moment in
which the individual should have reflected upon things and decided to
form better social habits; there is a kind of awareness operative at the
time, as the conversation is unfolding, which puts the individual in con-
tact with the relevant feature of the situation, and on the hook for acting
appropriately. To spin this point in more forward-looking terms, one rea-
son to make a lot of hay out of the sort of first-personal awareness that
individuals seem to have of their implicit biases is that this awareness
presents an opportunity for intervention. Implicit biases aren’t just coloring
our thoughts, perceptions, and actions from behind the locked door of
the unconscious, but are themselves palpably present (or at least
accessible) to awareness. This first-personal, in-the-moment awareness
of our biased thoughts, feelings, and actions opens up a distinctive set
of opportunities for us to do better.
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6. Conclusion
Of course, it may ormay not be productive for Valian orYancy to say some-
thing accusatory in such situations. In this vein, Exonerators argue that
holding individuals responsible for implicit discrimination would be not just
unfair but also strategically ill-advised. I take up related forward-looking
concerns elsewhere (2012, 2016a,b, forthcoming, ms). While I agree that
we should not necessarily saddle individuals with ‘-ist’ labels that portray
them as horrible people for possessing and expressing implicit biases, it is a
mistake to conflate sanctimonious name-calling with the view that implicit
discrimination is often worthy of blame, broadly construed. Blame is not
so blunt an instrument. We can acknowledge the failings of others and our-
selves to live up to our commitments without calling the sincerity of those
commitments into question. In many cases, we can insist that individuals
bear a legitimate degree of responsibility and blame, even if they lack perfect
awareness of what they do. If it is ever strategically unwise to lay blame, then
the upshot is not to jettison implicit bias from the sphere of moral responsi-
bility; the upshot is to take great care in locating it properly within that
sphere. Needless to say, I am not suggesting that the most effective way to
combat systemic discrimination and oppression is simply to stamp out indi-
viduals’ biased microbehaviors.We should combat systemic ills by changing
the system. In addition to thinking about how the system needs to change,
we cannot forget who needs to change it.29
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NOTES
1 The ambiguity of such rude behavior is often one of its harms. Members of stigmatized
groups can find ambiguous but potentially biased behavior more unsettling than outright
discrimination (Salvatore and Shelton, 2007; Sue et al., 2007). Such ambiguity also contributes
to the difficulty of measuring implicit biases and their effects on discriminatory behavior
(cf. Oswald et al., 2013; Greenwald, Banaji and Nosek, 2015), although I argue elsewhere that
concerns about the replicability and real-world import of implicit bias research are over-
blown, conflating important-but-localized outstanding empirical questions with hyperbolic
doubts about the entire field (Madva and Brownstein, 2017; Brownstein, Madva and
Gawronski, ms). See also note 26.
2 On structural-institutional interventions, see Valian, 1998; Kalev et al., 2006; Anderson,
2010; Levinson and Smith, 2012; and Madva, 2016b, forthcoming.
3 See Madva, 2012, 2016a,b, forthcoming, ms., although I intend to say more in future
work about the forward-looking role that responsibility and blame can play in motivating activ-
ism to initiate and implement structural-institutional reform. Cf. Calhoun, 1989; Young, 1990,
2011; Zheng, 2016; and Scaife, Stafford, Bunge, and Holroyd, manuscript.
4 See also Levy, 2014a,b, 2015, 2017; Saul, 2013; and the references in note 17.
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5 This article is written in a compatibilist spirit. See, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, for a
compatibilist interpretation of control, and Levy, 2014b, for an empirically-informed account of
how awareness is necessary for control.
6 See Holroyd, 2012, for trenchant discussion of the differences between these questions,
and a persuasive argument that individuals may sometimes be responsible for simply acquiring
and harboring implicit biases.
7 The same pattern was found in studies that measured, rather than manipulated, partic-
ipants’ views about whether their gut reaction reflected their genuine attitude (‘my own be-
liefs,’ ‘my real attitude’), and whether their ‘gut reactions reflect accurate beliefs about
homosexuals’ (Cooley et al., 2014, 2015). Angela Smith (2004, 2005) argues that individuals
should accept that their unreflective prejudices are genuinely their ‘own’ attitudes, because
taking ownership in this way will prompt individuals to take responsibility to do something
about them. At first glance, these findings suggest that ‘owning’ these attitudes leads partic-
ipants to reflectively endorse them, rather than to resist them. See Zheng, 2016, pp. 80–2,
regarding further studies with similar upshots. Identifying the downstream effects of various
ways of conceptualizing our biases is ultimately an empirical question, about which I say
more in Madva, ms. See also Scaife et al., ms.
8 Perhaps none of our attitudes are directly introspectible (King andCarruthers, 2012), and
all self-knowledge of attitudes is indirect or inferential. If so, this research suggests that our ca-
pacities to infer the contents of our implicit and explicit attitudes are surprisingly comparable.
See also note 14.
9 See Holroyd, 2012, pp. 292–4, for discussion of follow-up studies.
10 As reported in Farinola and Freedman, 21 October 2001.
11 As reported by Emanuel Levy.
12 Crowther, 12 November 1947.
13 For one survey of earlier psychological research and theories, and analysis of their norma-
tive and legal implications, see Lawrence, 1987.
14 In a similar way, Levy’s (2017) Exonerating arguments (e.g. that implicit biases are highly
uncontrollable, unintegrated with other attitudes, and unresponsive to reason) often apply
equally well to explicit attitudes. In fact, although Levy’s essay is purportedly focused on implicit
attitudes, much of the research he discusses is actually about self-reported attitudes (e.g. he dis-
cusses ‘celebrity contagion’ research, which finds that participants explicitly report that they’d
pay less money for clothing previously worn by celebrities if the clothing has been washed).
Thus, his arguments might suggest that human beings are, in general, simply too irrational to
be rightly held responsible for anything, but they don’t establish a categorical (non-graded), nor-
mative difference between implicit and explicit attitudes.
15 Cf. Gawronski et al., 2012, and Cooley et al., 2014, 2015.
16 See Glasgow, 2016, and Faucher, 2016, pp. 125–31, for compelling accounts of additional
factors that help to explain our intuitions regarding moral responsibility for implicit
discrimination.
17 Similarly, Kelly and Roedder (2008, p. 532) suggest that implicit biases might be morally
wrong and even ‘condemnable’ without being blameworthy; Fricker (2010) distinguishes be-
tween ‘moral-epistemic disappointment’ and blame; Anderson (2010) distinguishes between
merely ‘racially stigmatizing’ and genuinely racist behavior; and Pickard (2011, pp. 209, 216) ar-
gues, in the context of clinical treatment, that addicts should be held accountable for controlling
their impulses but not saddled with the ‘sting’ of ‘affective blame’ when they fall short. Zheng
cites several earlier theorists who take roughly this line, including Young (2011), who (citing the-
orists like Lawrence, 1987) argued as early as 1990 that individuals were forward-looking
responsible but not backward-looking blameworthy for their unreflective prejudices.
18 While Levy (2011, 2014a,b, 2017) takes the hardline stance that individuals are cate-
gorically not responsible for local control over their implicit biases, his writings on moral
responsibility, awareness, control, and reasons-responsiveness make frequent reference to
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degrees. For example, he writes that, ‘the degree of accessibility of information seems to cor-
relate (roughly) with the degree of moral responsibility of the agent for failing to utilize it’
(2014b, 32). Insofar as the evidence suggests that implicit biases are in-between accessible
to individuals, why not conclude that individuals are in-between responsible for accessing
them? Levy instead asserts that only ‘easy and effortless’ accessibility suffices for direct
responsibility (2014b, p. 33), but this assertion is difficult to square with the prior quote about
degrees of accessibility. Setting the threshold here (or anywhere) seems arbitrary given that
we are clearly ‘dealing with a continuum’ (2014b, p. 83).
A PPQ referee points out that there is at least one very important context in which we make
binary responsibility judgments, namely, in guilty-or-not legal decisions, before engaging in the
more complex questions of sentencing and punishment. As I say in the following paragraph and
§4, my view is that individuals typically are responsible and blameworthy for their implicit dis-
criminatory acts (if forced to choose, my verdict is ‘guilty’), such that it is morally incumbent
upon us to make good on them and do better, but the degraded accessibility, controllability, rea-
sons-responsiveness, etc., of our implicit biases are mitigating factors.
19 For empirical investigation into academic and non-academic intuitions and views about
moods, and, in particular, how to distinguish moods from emotions, see Beedie et al., 2005.
20 Some who argue that moods have no necessary connection to qualitative experience (e.g.
Griffiths, 1989, p. 28; Prescott-Couch, 2005, p. 56) overlook the possibility that moods might be
felt without being noticed. See Siemer, 2009, for an account of moods that privileges their expe-
riential and affective components.
21 Cf. Coates and Swenson, 2013.
22 Cf. Smith, 2004, pp. 344–5.
23 A more frequently discussed mitigating factor, more extreme than the moods case, is de-
pression (Coates and Swenson, 2013). AsKorsgaard (1997, p. 41) suggests, ‘people’s terror, idle-
ness, shyness, or depression… [are] forces that block their susceptibility to the influence of
reason.’ The so-called mood disorders are psychologically and normatively very different from
transient moods (Pickard, 2011). Thanks toKarenHarkins for insightful discussion of this issue.
24 See, e.g., Schlenker and Darby, 1981; and Glasgow, 2016. It could be that part of what
explains the divergence of intuitions surrounding responsibility for implicit discrimination is that
Exonerators are more focused on the (typically) smaller-scale, local consequences of implicit dis-
crimination while non-Exonerators are focused on the large-scale, aggregate consequences.
25 Thanks to Susanna Siegel for insightful questions and advice about distinguishing be-
tween effects of moods.
26 Studies such as this one reveal how implicit attitudes and moods are more than analogi-
cally related. Chartrand et al. (2006) explore numerous relationships and interactions between
moods and implicit attitudes, for example, finding that priming techniques that activate
valenced implicit attitudes induce moods with the same valence. Holland et al. (2012) found, like
Forgas, that participants in happy moods acted on the basis of their implicit attitudes, while
those in sadmoods acted on the basis of their reflective beliefs. Such findings also highlight some
of themany contextual moderators that determinewhen and how implicit attitudes influence be-
havior, and help to explain whymeta-analyses that ignore such variables are likely to bemislead-
ing (Brownstein, Madva and Gawronski, ms.). See note 1.
27 Cf. Adams, 1985, esp. pp. 25–7, on cognitive sins; Sher, 2009, p. 21, on culpable igno-
rance; and Raz, 2010, on domains of secure competence.
28 It must be acknowledged that many women live with experiences of vulnerability
that partly inform what’s going on in this encounter. It’s possible, for example, that this
individual’s past experiences with harassment make it the case that she’d be uncomfortable
alone with any man in this situation. Yancy explores the gendered, intersectional complex-
ity of this scenario, and the woman’s potential perspectives on the encounter, in far greater
depth. However, if we stipulate, e.g., that they are riding the elevator in an otherwise-
crowded, publicly accessible building in the middle of the day in an extremely low-crime
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area, etc., it is reasonable to expect that many white women would not feel equally un-
comfortable around a similarly dressed white man. There are also countless cases of white
men who react with instinctive fear or discomfort toward black men, and black women,
despite being in obviously safe conditions. Again, this is effectively what 70% of partici-
pants admitted in Devine et al., 1991.
29 This article benefited enormously from feedback and conversation with many people, in-
cluding Taylor Carman, Katie Gasdaglis, Tamar Szabó Gendler, Lydia Goehr, Christia Mer-
cer, Patricia Kitcher, and Virginia Valian; from the audience at the 2013 Pacific Division
meeting of the American Philosophical Association, especially from insightful commentary by
Manuel Vargas; from extensive discussion with Michael Brownstein, Natalia Washington,
andDanielKelly during a symposium on implicit bias andmoral responsibility at the 2013meet-
ing of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, including excellent questions from
Susanna Siegel and Elizabeth Schechter; and from students inmy Spring 2013 seminar at Berke-
ley, including Shannon Doberneck, Karen Harkins, Lianna Mecano, Dylan Murray, Jeremy
Pober, and Jen Kanyuk. This article was revised with institutional support from the Mellon
Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of California, Berkeley; Vassar College; and Califor-
nia State Polytechnic University, Pomona.
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